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The United States Senate plays a peculiar role when it comes to this country’s foreign 
policy. Lines are blurred between responsibilities as a mere body that ratifies, agents in the 
negotiation process, and investigators in the creation. Nothing adds to the ambiguity more than a 
controversial international issue. Where should the Senate stand during the shuffle that is policy 
establishment? With whatever negotiators and the administration say is the correct move? With 
the obvious opinions demonstrated by their constituents? With the platform clearly voiced by 
their respective political party? The answers to these questions are never particularly clear, and 
history has proven that the Senate has previously failed to stand a solid ground in addressing 
foreign policy controversies. However, there is a time in the Senate’s record where one Senator 
in particular was willing to face these challenges with a thorough, methodical, and holistic 
approach to facilitate the ratification of one of the most divisive treaties of his day. Minority 
Leader Howard Baker, Jr. was no stranger to the obstacles presented by U.S.-Latin American 
relations, especially concerning Panama. Amidst cries of communism and political party 
treachery, he was able to guide the Senate towards a policy decision that ultimately proved to be 
in the United States’ best interests. The role Senator Baker assumed in the ratification of the 
Panama Canal Treaties is one that should be emulated by current and future Senators in the 
creation of modern foreign policy. His strides towards a collaborative, bipartisan decision are 
ones that are still critical to ensure sound international relations in today’s global politics.   
Howard H. Baker, Jr. was born into politics. Just one in a family of lawyers and active 
Republicans, Baker was predisposed to affairs of state; both his father, Howard Baker Sr., and 
father-in-law, Everett Dirksen, served in the U.S. Congress as Republican Representatives. Baker 
naturally transitioned from practicing law to serving in public office, gaining his first Senate seat 
in 1966. While being an influential minority leader during the Watergate scandal investigations 
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and serving as both Minority and Majority Leader stand out against his many accolades during 
his time in the Senate, his influence in the international affairs realm should also not be 
overlooked. Baker was involved in many significant foreign policy decisions during his political 
career, ranging from Asian-American relations during his ambassadorship to Japan to the defeat 
of the SALT II treaties in the late 1970s.
1
 The ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, 
however, was one foreign policy challenge he did not anticipate to lead. When asked by 
President Carter to help ratify the treaties in the Senate, Baker reflected that it was one question 
he had wished the President never asked.
2
 
The Panama Canal has a patched presence throughout United States history. Granted the 
rights to build and defend the Canal in 1903 through the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, the 
structural accomplishment was rarely debated in America afterwards. A series of riots, threats, 
and non-successful peace talks in the Canal Zone beginning in the 1960s, however, brought the 
Panama Canal back to the forefront of foreign policy issues.
3
 For the next several years, the 
Panama Canal would be hotly debated in an attempt to update an outdated treaty and replace 
with one serving both the United States and Panama’s internal interests. By the 1970s, it was 
clear that if a new agreement between the two countries was not reached violence would strike. 
Jimmy Carter arrived on the tumultuous scene with his election in 1977, hopeful to settle the 
outstanding issue and repair relationships with Latin America.
4
 These simple goals would not 
prove to be easily accomplished, as Panama’s acting leader General Omar Torrijos almost 
ensured. Torrijos established himself as a worthy adversary. He was not easily swayed by the 
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overwhelming presence and pressure of the United States, and had the backing of enough 
Panamanians to incite revolt for respect if necessary. Panama was in a position to make headlines 
if the U.S. did not recognize their needs; Torrijos had the country poised on the margins of the 
international stage. Latin American relations were proving to be of increasing importance in the 
global world, and Torrijos had made clear that Panama could be of no exception.
5
 On the other 
hand, Carter was hardly less eager to ignore him. Recruiting both leaders of the Senate, Majority 
Leader Robert Byrd and Minority Leader Howard Baker, Jr., to engage in treaty ratifications, the 
stage was set for one of the most divisive political issues either nation had experienced thus far.  
An initial agreement was reached between President Carter and General Torrijos in 
August of 1977. This agreement provided the basis for two new treaties; one detailing the 
operation of the Canal and its subsequent transition to Panama after the year 2000, and the other, 
dubbed the “Neutrality Treaty,” describing the neutrality of the canal and the position of the 
United States to defend it thereafter.
6
 Immediately, this vague agreement raised skepticism and 
antagonism. Concerning the first treaty, apprehension was expressed over how well an unstable 
dictatorship could effectively control and operate the Canal, and why the United States was even 
willing to hand it over to Panama in the first place. Moreover, headlines were quoting numbers 
such as $600 million as the Canal transfer’s price tag, enough to scare any taxpayer.
7
 Yet it was 
the Neutrality Treaty that quickly became the center of attention, with both sides finding holes in 
the language and ambiguity for interpretation. The United States’ terms for intervention in case 
the need arose was not adequately addressed, which gave rise to debate over the rights of passage 
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for warships. Indeed, it was debated whether, even if this was included in explicit terms, Panama 
would uphold the agreement given their authoritarian rule.
8
 In a White House press release of the 
President’s address on the Panama Canal Treaties in February 1978, Carter attempted to abate 
American concern by stating, “It is obvious that we can take whatever military action is 
necessary to make sure that the canal always remains open and safe.”
9
 Yet Torrijos made clear 
that point was not obvious, and in fact, was not something they had agreed upon. The fine line of 
sovereignty was being blurred as both sides argued over who retained what rights and when.  
The Panama Canal Treaties were not of issue only to the two nations listed in the 
contract. On the global front, the dispute extended to all of Latin American, and given the United 
States’ presence internationally, the world at large. At the time, Carter was left dealing with the 
bad taste Vietnam had put in the mouths of most Americans. On the one hand, it was clear that 
another unwanted, unsuccessful military expedition should be avoided at all costs. On the other, 
Carter did not want the world to see the United States as pulling back from its global 
responsibilities due to shame or embarrassment. Latin America’s turbulent history with 
imperialism was another factor to be considered, as well. The Neutrality Treaty reflected Carter’s 
conflicting interests by remaining rather elusive. Yet these were the points that needed to be 
overtly expressed to ensure America retained its prestigious global position, according to Roger 
Fontaine.
10
 Director of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University, Fontaine’s views were 
widely circulated among the Senate and administration for advice. Fontaine made clear that 
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“what should not be open to debate is this country’s right to an open and secure passageway 
connecting the planet’s two principal oceans, and the proper means to insure it,” amongst 
widespread debate about just that.
11
 This conflict of interest, extending onto the wider Latin 
American population, had the ability to ruin the crumbling relations the U.S. held with their 
southern counterparts. Moreover, rumors of a connection between Panama and communist 
parties in Eastern Europe were beginning to proliferate, alarming conservatives during an already 
uneasy time. The communism factor played well into the hands of those who were against 
lending any more power to Torrijos, who were convinced would abuse it unless strict 
prohibitions were put in place. It became increasingly clearer that certain amendments were 
necessary if there was to be any hope for ratification.  
Senate Leaders Byrd and Baker were left to deal with the myriad of controversies the best 
they could. Recognizing the need for clarity if ratification was to be obtained, they set about to 
collaborate on amendments. The result was two amendments that expressed in direct language 
the Canal’s neutrality and America’s position pursuant to the Neutrality Treaty. The first 
reaffirmed both countries’ ability to defend the Canal when necessary, while preserving 
Panama’s sovereignty in the Zone. The last statement carried the most impact, declaring, “The 
provisions of this article shall not be construed as conferring upon the United States of America a 
right of intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Panama and any action by the 
United States of America pursuant to this article shall not be directed against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of the Republic of Panama.”
12
 The second amendment 
guarantees U.S. vessels priority during times of need, allowing them to go to the head of the line 




 “Amendment.” Baker Papers, Box 14, Folder 8 “Foreign Relations Committee, Panama Canal Treaties 1977,” Modern 





 Yet these were not satisfying enough to quell the fears of those in the Senate 
who were still sitting on the fence. An unexpected freshman Senator from Arizona, Dennis 
DeConcini, threw himself in the spotlight with his own amendment. The DeConcini reservation 
proclaimed that the United States would have the right to “take such steps as it deems necessary, 
including…force…to reopen the Canal or restore the operations of the Canal.”
14
 An incredibly 
forward statement given the previous agreements with Panama, most of the Senate seemed to be 
calmed by this addition and adopted the reservation by a 75-23 vote.
15
 
The Senate’s role in international policy is to advise and consent, as enumerated by the 
Constitution. Yet Byrd and Baker’s amendments, along with the controversial DeConcini 
amendment, were obvious examples of the Senate’s place in treaty negotiation and formation. 
Baker was the driving force for amendments, and made it clear to both Carter and Torrijos that 
without his additions the original treaties the two had proposed would never pass in the Senate. 
In this example, Senate involvement in the treaty’s configuration proved to be necessary and 
prudent. The DeConcini reservation, however, provided a contrasting example. Neither the 
Senate nor the Carter administration notified Panamanian leaders of the revision in advance, and 
the release of the statement caused Torrijos to gravely reconsider the entire agreement.
16
 
Nevertheless, the DeConcini amendment was critical to gain the necessary votes for ratification, 
and eventually Torrijos relented and allowed the treaty, now with three revisions, to be handed 
over to the Senate for final passage.  
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As Minority Leader, Senator Baker was in a special position when the treaties arrived in 
the Senate. Even before amendments were proposed, it was widely recognized that without 
Baker’s approval, the treaties would never pass. The American Conservative Union did well to 
inform the public about the importance of Baker’s vote on this subject, printing full page ads in 
The Tennessean with the headline “Senator Baker, alone, can save the Panama Canal!”
17
 Other 
newspapers were not blind to the influence Baker would have on galvanizing the Senate to a 
vote, and articles were printed regularly reminding the Senator of his authority. The Republican 
Party was also putting enormous pressure on Baker as Minority Leader to adopt their collective 
decision of rejecting the treaties, pressure that reached a boiling point in February of 1978. 
Fourteen Republican Representatives sent a note to Baker stating, “We respectfully suggest that 
you formally step aside as the Minority Leader of the Senate for the duration of the debate on the 
Panama Canal treaties.” Citing the Republican National Platform of 1976 as well as the 
“majority view” of the Republicans and the general public, their suggestion was nevertheless 
unprecedented.
18
 Baker responded with a firm stance that he would not yield to party politics and 
abandon his duties to the Senate.
19
 This was a common theme throughout Baker’s tenure in the 
Senate, and one that was critical to the Panama Canal debates. In an interview with the former 
Senator on April 27
th
, 2012, Baker revealed that he knew his voting in favor of the treaties would 
provide the appropriate “cover” other Republicans would need to also vote yes, essential to 
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With pressures mounting daily, Baker’s task by the end of 1977 was daunting. Given 
such a divisive issue, he exercised every effort to be completely informed of the interests on both 
sides. It would go a long way in ensuring his final decision would not be influenced by media 
outcries or party pressures. Not a stranger to the Foreign Relations Committee, Baker 
commissioned two consultants, one for and the other against the treaties but both highly educated 
in U.S.-Latin American relations, to relay their knowledge during hearings.
21
 Drawing from his 
days as a trial lawyer, he took an active role in the hearings himself to uncover all the necessary 
information regarding the treaties. But hearings in Washington D.C. were not enough for him to 
draw definite conclusions; he arranged a trip to the country of Panama itself. Newspapers were 
critical of this step in the decision-making process, calling it “An Expensive Decision” that was 
being funded by taxpayers.
22
 Yet Baker still defends his trip, recently remarking that it was “to 
see firsthand Panama and the internal arrangements, meaning Torrijos and his governance; and… 
to give other senators an opportunity to see… what the circumstances were.”
23
 The trip also 
provided Baker a forum to talk face-to-face with Torrijos concerning the treaties as they stood in 
January of 1978. Although Torrijos was reportedly “surprised and upset” when informed that 
additional amendments would have to be conceded to garner the support necessary for Senate 
passage, ultimately he gave Baker his assurance that he would back the adjustments.
24
 Flying 
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back to the United States, Baker was now confident that, given the amendments, the treaties 
stood in the best interests of both nations. Persuading the rest of the Senate, especially those 
Republicans still on the fence, to this view was the last, near insurmountable hurdle.  
To say that Baker was receiving bad press for his actions at the time is an understatement. 
Pictured as everything from a bird preying over other Senators and the treaty
25
, to standing on 
stilts in between two sides of the canal
26
, to swimming through a Panama Canal filled with 
sharks
27
, the amount of negative attention being thrown onto Baker was overwhelming. The 
press had plenty to feed off of, given the pushback on the treaties the Republican Party, 
Tennesseans, and the general public were providing. Republican Representatives did not stop at 
asking Baker to step down from his Minority Leader position; personal letters from individuals 
also began pouring in. As Representative William Harbor would write, the issue went beyond 
supporting a controversial treaty, to fracturing the Republican Party and the platform it stood 
upon. Harbor ends his letter to Baker by declaring, “I would hope that you could see your way 
clear to intervene in this situation so that we can go about our proper task of electing 
Republicans.”
28
 He was one of many in a staunchly right-wing faction within the Republicans 
adamantly against the treaties, notoriously led by Ronald Reagan. Reagan waged war via the post 
office against Baker and the treaties. Thousands of letters were sent to citizens around the nation, 
calling the treaties “one of the most serious mistakes in its [the United States] 200 year history” 
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and “a line-by-line blueprint for potential disaster for our country.”
29
 The four-page letter ends 
with a request for donations to the Emergency Panama Canal Fund, a brainchild of Reagan’s 
established by the Republican National Committee and National Republican Congressional 
Committee. And these were not the only ones close to home putting their opinions on paper. It is 
estimated that by mid-March of 1978, Baker had received 64,000 letters, almost all urging him to 
vote against the treaties.
30
 Constituents from around Tennessee were showing their outrage at 
their elected Senator’s views, citing everything from Baker’s ignorance on communism in the 
area to his wasteful expenditures on the Panama trip as criticism. A concerned resident of 
Knoxville is an example of the prevailing attitude in Tennessee, writing, “Are your constituents 
in Tennessee, who vote for you, and have written you concerning this matter so dumb, ignorant 
and illiterate that our opinions are of no significance, or will our Senator feed us what is good for 
us and ignore our opinions?” and ending with the pointed statement, “See you at the ballot box 
next election.”
31
 One cartoon even shows then-governor Ray Blanton yelling at Baker, asking 
“What are you trying to do – give us Tennesseans a bad name?”
32
 Recognizing Baker’s role in 
the advocacy of the treaties, citizens outside of his own constituency were also sending in their 




Polls completed around the same time provided the numbers to back up written 
sentiment. One popularly cited poll published in The New York Times in November of 1977 
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showed a dismal 29% approval rating, compared to 49% disapproving.
34
 A Gallup poll done one 
month prior, called “in effect, a national referendum,” reveals similar results, at 46% 
disapproving.
35
 Baker commissioned Polls, Inc. in December of the same year to conduct a 
telephone survey of his own constituents, which, not surprisingly, shows opposition at 45% and 
indecision at 32% of those surveyed.
36
 Yet some hope remained. These same polls showed that 
when asked about the treaties with amendments guaranteeing U.S. interests, the margin for 
approval almost reversed. In The New York Times poll, the approval rating jumped to 63%, and 
Tennesseans likewise would favor a treaty with guarantees by about a two-to-one ratio.
37
 With 
this in mind, alongside promise from Torrijos for favorable reception of amendments, Baker 
knew that the treaties could pass muster in the Senate. What he also knew was that the votes 
needed to meet the 2/3 majority would have to be from the Republican end; using the polls, 
thorough reasoning, and his famous ability to persuade people to a more moderate position, 
Baker took to animating his previously opposed party counterparts.
38
  
After a long and arduous process, Baker had a taste of success in the final Senate vote on 
the treaty ratification. By a mere 68-32 vote, the treaties passed, amendments attached, and 
Baker believed he had done everything to protect the interests of this country and preserve the 
appropriate wishes of Panama. This moment of success, however, was fleeting. The year 1980 
brought about the beginning of the presidential campaigns, with Baker well-anticipated as a 
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contestant. Baker was acutely aware of the upcoming election and the effects a pro-treaty vote 
could have on his career; indeed, his actions of just a few months earlier brought about 
devastation to his presidential aspirations. Once the forerunner and a viable candidate, Baker lost 
the nomination by a wide margin to Ronald Reagan, by that time well recognized for his letter 
campaign against the Panama Canal. Looking at Baker’s resume in the political arena, one issue 
stands out as a contributing factor to this loss. While Baker was able to bridge the Panama Canal 
issue for treaty ratification, ultimately he sank amidst the outrage of his own political party and 
constituents. Baker did enjoy the support of a few loyal followers and dedicated citizens who 
understood the significance of his decision at the time; many wrote offering their support and 
vote for the presidential election no matter the treaty outcome.
39
 Overall though, it was not 
enough to garner the support necessary to win a contest as large as the presidency.  
An editorial published before the presidential campaigns gained full steam provides an 
interesting opinion on the fallout of Baker with the Republican Party. Stating the Panama Canal 
treaties as the “single issue” upon which Baker was being judged, the article ends with, “…we 
don’t believe someone who has gained party leadership recognition because of a consistent 
career of contribution to and support of the party and its principles ought to be dumped just 
because of one vote.”
40
 This one editorial was not exceptional in its assessment. As history 
would reveal, “Baker’s support [of the Panama Canal treaties] went a long way to ensuring that 
he would not be the Republican presidential nomination in 1980.”
41
 Just months prior, his 
presidential prospects had seemed exceptionally promising. And he was not the only one whose 
political career was altered off course due to the Panama Canal vote. Eight incumbent Senators 
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In retrospect, it seems a shame that a political leader courageous enough to face the 
challenges of controversial foreign policy head-on was ultimately punished for his actions. If 
Americans are dissatisfied with Senators who do nothing in the way of creating beneficial 
legislation, what message is being sent when they do not vote in higher offices those who clear 
the way for important treaties to be passed? The answer to this question proves to be rather 
cyclical. The political arena is a linked chain. The ideas constituents have may not always be 
represented in the buildings of our nation’s capital, but these are the people who ultimately 
decide the fate of the nation through their vote. Americans have no trouble in exercising their 
power to remove someone from office who they think has done harm. As a republic, so it should 
be. Acutely aware that the fate of their careers lies with the people, Senators are no strangers to 
having to appease their constituents. Moreover, there are political party leaders to be heeded. 
And so the link seems unbreakable, between concern over reelection and alignment with party 
ideals. Yet another question to be asked remains: is this chain of accountability always beneficial 
to the country at large when constituents, and even political parties, are uninformed and 
misjudging?  
One need look no further than opinion polls to see that the average American’s faith and 
trust in the government has declined over the past decades. The modern-day view of Congress is 
likened to that of a slow political machine, too weighed down on either side by partisan politics 
that compromise is never reached, and new legislation rarely passed. The current dissatisfaction 
with Congress in particular begs the question of what constituents want and expect out of their 
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Senators and Representatives.  The three typical roles of Congressmen or women are that of a 
delegate, trustee, or politico. There are arguments pointing to the benefits of each type, and 
indeed many Senators switch perspectives as necessary. Yet the growing influence of large 
political parties, mainly the Democratic and Republican Parties, give off the impression that 
Senators are to be strict delegates – not to their constituents, but to their respective Party. While 
this allegiance to party platform may lie in accordance with constituent beliefs, it depresses the 
Senator’s individual capacity to decide what is best. As Ambassador Thomas Graham, former 
U.S. diplomat and negotiator on arms control treaties, reflected in a recent interview, 
“Everything is seen through the prism of partisan political interest.”
43
 
In the international policy realm, partisan politics can be extremely detrimental due to its 
limiting nature. As previously noted, Senators already have to decide with whom they will side 
when ratifying legislation. With foreign policy, however, an additional audience member is 
added, that of an entirely different nation. The beliefs vested in those people and of that 
particular country must then be taken into account as well. Moreover, the relationship the U.S. 
has fostered with that nation, indeed that entire region, must also be accounted for. These 
complex connections can easily be missed if Senators are forced to focus solely on the interests 
of their Party. How might this relate to Senator Baker’s position during the Panama Canal treaty 
ratifications? Baker was able to answer this question of balance, and the outcome of his reply can 
reveal the flaws in partisan politics and ill-informed constituent pressures.  
In order to fully emulate Baker’s example, his actions must be studied and examined for 
their value. The first striking characteristic of the process through which Baker evaluated the 
Panama Canal treaties was the tremendous thoroughness of his efforts. The extensive Foreign 
                                                          
43
 Graham, Thomas. "Baker Scholars Research Interview." Personal interview. 25 Apr. 2012. 
Senno 16 
 
Relations Committee hearings with briefs presented by opposing sides, his personal trip to 
Panama to secure the cooperation of Torrijos, as well as the meticulous assessment of the details 
of each clause can all lend credence to prove Baker’s unrelenting effort to be fully informed of 
the treaties. When asked about dealing with the overwhelming outpour of opinions from 
outsiders, Baker replied, “You can’t afford to totally ignore that, but you can’t afford to be 
totally captured by it either.”
44
 Preferring to use his independent and informed judgment rather 
than be swayed by polls and constituents, Baker was able to come to rationalized conclusions 
that were in the best interest of both countries. Although the Republican Party was taking a 
strong stand against the treaties, and Baker himself, it did not cloud his ability to help create 
good policy. On the other hand, The Wall Street Journal recognized the storm politicians like 
Reagan were creating at the time. In an article titled “The Big Flap Over the Canal,” the author 
points to Reagan’s hope that his “angry Panama speeches will help his election interests. They 
may, but it’s difficult to see how such talk helps the national interest.”
45
 Baker preferred to be 
subtle about his views, knowing that an angry outburst of policy statement would not ease the 
process or provide the support he was looking for during ratification.  
It is difficult enough to wade through the myriad of opinions offered when a new piece of 
legislation is up for debate. The level of difficulty increases exponentially if ratification has 
potential to become extremely controversial, as was the case with the Panama Canal debates. 
Senator Baker handled thousands of constituent complaints, opposing letter-writing campaigns, 
party outcries and public discontent. The heat of the moment is enough to produce poor results 
from any political participant, yet Baker was able to step back from these pressures and remain 
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calm in his decision-making. Just as the accomplishments of Baker during the Canal treaties 
period should not be forgotten, nor should the ramifications it had for his political career be 
ignored. Ultimately, he was judged harshly by both his own Party and his followers for his 
actions, judgment reflected in future elections. Knowing this, Baker could have easily been 
swayed by the Republicans to conform to their preconceived treaty answer, guaranteeing him 
further favor in the forthcoming elections. Yet he chose an unpopular response in the nation’s 
time of need; arguably, examples of this type of political courage are rarely seen today due to the 
increasingly burdensome pressures political parties place on their affiliates. Are Senators always 
concerned with reelection as opposed to the actual issue at hand? Richard Viguerie, notorious at 
the time for his mail-action campaigns and right-wing conservatism, provides a demonstrative 
example. At the time of the Panama Canal debates, Viguerie reminded Senators that 
“[Conservative activists] can go to the polls, look for a person’s name on the ballot who favored 
these treaties and vote against him.’”
46
 It is no surprise that many Senators were “taking a 
position that had been carefully road tested for political advantage.”
47
 The evidence points to 
reelection as a shade that too often overshadows the more basic issues at hand, leaving Senators 
to make poor policy judgments.  
While the Panama Canal treaties and Baker’s subsequent actions provide a noteworthy 
example for the Senate, it should be noted that a controversial issue should not be a prerequisite 
for Senators to disengage in partisan politics and the pressures of reelection. The mere notion of 
controversy is enough to heighten the volume of these outside influences, yet it is not always a 
determining factor in the seriousness of pressing issues before Congress. Nor should it be 
construed that partisan politics always leads to bad policy. Admittedly party interests can and 
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have led to beneficial policy in this country’s history. Senator Baker himself agrees that “the 
party system has contributed to a vital forum for the debate of issues.”
48
 The distinction should 
be made, however, at a time when a political party’s power becomes so overwhelming as to stifle 
the actions of Senators in attempting to determine what is actually in the best interests of 
everyone involved. Baker would go on to say in his interview, “I would like to see sometimes, 
one side or the other agree more readily to consider a particular point of view.”
49
 Likewise, 
constituent outcries can often silence Senators’ own opinions for fear of their careers. Ultimately, 
there are too many players in the game to point to just one to blame for failed legislation. 
Senators must take into account the interests of all participants, and yet not be so afraid of their 
own parties or constituents as to fail to take the appropriate actions. As Baker’s career proves, 
citizens will be the ultimate judge of a Senator’s career; those opinions, however, do not 
necessarily reflect the success or failure of treaties.  
Given the benefit of hindsight, it can be determined that ratification of the Panama Canal 
treaties was indeed the best course of action for the United States and the relationship with Latin 
America. Baker will be the first to continually defend this, stating that “ratification of it was 
exactly the right thing…even more so now in my view than it was then. It was remarkable that 
we were able to do it given the furor that was created in large part with the press…because so 
many people risked political retaliation. But it was the right thing to do.”
50
 Although these 
treaties were passed over thirty years ago, it does not appear that the Senate has moved much in 
the way of bipartisanship recently. The New Start Treaty of 2010 provides a strikingly similar 
example to that of the Panama Canal. Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Foreign Relations 
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Committee and a Democrat backing an important Obama initiative, almost echoes Baker in his 
sentiment that the Start treaty should not be governed by partisan politics. Yet the rest of the 
article in the Los Angeles Times paints a picture in stark contrast to Senator Kerry’s hopes. “The 
partisan politics of ratification were clear in the debate,” and indeed are more than lucid 
throughout the article. Little is said concerning the actual treaty and the effects it will have for 
future Russian nuclear arms discussions. Instead, the article is littered with statements 
concerning Republicans “crossing over” to the Democratic side in order to give the treaty the 
final 71-26 approving vote.
51
 Ambassador Graham says he was not surprised by this outcome, 
given that the trend lately has been winning over Republicans or Democrats for votes, rather than 
focusing on the particular issue at hand. Going even further, Graham comments that, “Under the 
circumstances that exist today, it’s difficult to imagine someone playing the unifying role that 
Senator Baker played in his U.S. Senate.”
52
  This is the situation Senators are left with today; a 
confusing mix of desire to be bipartisan while living in the reality of partisan pressures.  
The value of bipartisanship is not completely lost on the U.S. Congress. Its hope for 
survival exists in the minds of Senators like Kerry, who understand that important initiatives 
cannot pass without compromise. Nevertheless, with the massive shape partisan politics is 
forming in today’s Senate, the word compromise is slowly morphing into the word sacrifice. A 
sacrifice former Senators like Baker have come to fully appreciate. Modern foreign policy 
politics has lead to the absolute need for Senators to emulate Baker’s example and approach the 
floor willing to cooperate with other Parties, other national interests, and other views rather than 
solely their own. As the Panama Canal debates prove, it is certainly not an easy task. But as 
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Americans, there should be hope that elected Senators are as courageous as Baker was in their 
own endeavors. As John F. Kenney wrote, “ ‘it is … the compromisers and conciliators…who 
are faced with the severest tests of political courage as they oppose the extremist views of their 
constituents.’”
53
 Former Senator Howard Baker, Jr., the Great Conciliator, passed this test, and it 
should be impressed upon Senators today to strive for the same.  
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